




DEAKIN LAW ORATION 
 
TOO MUCH LAW?  
RISK, REASONABLENESS AND THE 
JUDGE AS REGULATOR 
JUSTICE CHRIS MAXWELL  
 
I INTRODUCTION 
In March 1902, as the first Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, Alfred Deakin moved the second reading of the Bill which became 
the Judiciary Act 1903. That was the Act which established the High Court of 
Australia. The new Parliament of the Commonwealth thereby gave effect to 
section 71 of the Constitution, which provided: 
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal 
Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia …  
The Bill provided for five Justices. Deakin told the House that they would 
cost £3000 each per year, and the Court as a whole £30 000. Referring no 
doubt to the Boer War, Deakin asked rhetorically: ‘Can we afford three 
quarters of a million for war, and not £30 000 for justice?’1 
In 1908, as Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin welcomed the Naval Fleet of the 
United States on its arrival in Melbourne. This visit had been arranged at 
Deakin’s personal invitation, and accepted by President Theodore Roosevelt 
himself. Deakin had quite deliberately refrained from consulting the Imperial 
                                                 
 President, Court of Appeal, Supreme Court of Victoria. This Deakin Law School Oration was 
delivered on 19 August 2009. 
1 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives 18 March 1902, 10987. 
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Government about the plan, and the Colonial Office was furious when it 
learnt of ‘this diplomatic activity between Australia and a foreign power … 
and even more so when a premature announcement made the plans public 
knowledge’.2 
What, you might wonder, do these memorable events have to do with the 
subject of tonight’s lecture?  
II PHILIP HOWARD’S AMERICAN CRITIQUE 
The title of this lecture is prompted by the writings of a contemporary 
American lawyer, Philip Howard. Howard is not an academic writer. He is a 
senior partner in the New York office of a large Washington-based law firm, 
Covington & Burling. His latest book is entitled Life Without Lawyers: 
Liberating Americans from Too Much Law.3 
This is not a new theme for Philip Howard. The title of his first book, 
published in 1994, announced his stance with unmistakeable clarity. It was 
entitled The Death of Common Sense: How Law is Suffocating America. He 
followed it up in 2001 with The Collapse of the Common Good: How 
America’s Lawsuit Culture Undermines Our Freedom.  
I first heard of Philip Howard’s work when I was in San Francisco in January 
this year. My oldest and closest friend is, as it happens, a San Francisco-based 
partner in the same law firm. He gave me a copy of Howard’s 2001 book, The 
Collapse of the Common Good.  
I was soon to hear more of Philip Howard, however. In April I read a review 
of his most recent book in the New York Review of Books. Then, on 7 July, 
just as I was starting to think about what to say tonight, I heard Philip Howard 
interviewed by Damien Carrick on the ABC’s Law Report. 
I should say that I regard the Law Report as doing for thinking about the law 
what the Science Show does for thinking about science. The programme’s 
weekly investigation and analysis of current legal issues is without peer in this 
country. The interview with Philip Howard was a perfect example. 
                                                 
2 Marilyn Lake, ‘“The Brightness of Eyes and Quiet Assurance Which Seems to Say 
American” – Alfred Deakin’s Identification with Republican Manhood’ (2007) 38 Australian 
Historical Studies 32, 49. 
3 Philip K Howard, Life Without Lawyers: Liberating Americans from Too Much Law (2009). 
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Philip Howard’s thesis is that the fear of being sued is crippling American 
society. 
[W]hat’s happened over the last 40 years slowly, but now pervasively, is 
that law is involved in people’s daily choices. … People are scared that any 
ordinary accident might be their ruin. … Americans who deal with the 
public go through the day looking over their shoulder instead of looking 
where they want to go.4  
Howard gives an example which, as we shall see, echoes views which have 
been expressed in Australia:  
[T]here’s nothing left in an American playground that would attract a kid 
over the age of four. There’s no high slides, there’s no jungle gyms, there 
are no climbing ropes, there are no see-saws, there are no merry-go-rounds 
– literally, because anything that’s fun not only involves a risk, but the 
certainty that from time to time there’ll be an accident.5 
Asked to explain why he thought this litigation culture had developed, 
Howard said: 
It’s what happens when you develop a … pathological distrust of authority 
… [W]e woke up to these abuses in America: racism, gender 
discrimination, in the ’60s, and one of the solutions was to say ‘Well we 
won’t have bad decisions by judges or officials if they no longer make 
decisions’. And so we got this idea that people had a right, this whole idea 
of individual … rights - to sue for anything. Just make people prove that 
they made the right decision. … [P]retty soon, justice is out of control and 
no-one trusts it any more. Because there’s nobody enforcing the social 
norms of reasonableness.6  
And the solution? Howard sees judges as the key: 
Well you have to restore the red lights and green lights, and so judges 
should have the job of judging. Their job is not to avoid asserting values, 
their job is to assert values. So they need to reach inside themselves the 
whole day long and say, ‘Is this within the bounds of what reasonable 
people would expect? Is this a claim that a society should permit?’ Because 
if you allow the claim, that establishes the boundaries of everybody else’s 
freedom. If you allow a claim when one out of a million kids falls off the 
see-saw and breaks his skull, then all the see-saws are going to disappear. 
                                                 
4 ABC Radio National, ‘Litigation American Style’, The Law Report, 7 July 2009 
<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/lawreport/stories/2009/2606115.htm> at 30 September 2009. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
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So someone has to make a judgment about whether that’s a reasonable risk 
or not as a matter of law. … [Judges] have to understand that they’re 
representing all of society, they’re not just a referee in some skirmish 
between two parties.7 
Howard believes that it would 
dramatically … turn down the heat of the fear of litigation in America, if 
judges would simply start acting as gatekeepers, and just affirmatively and 
aggressively keep claims and defences reasonable.8 
Hence my title: ‘Risk, Reasonableness and the Judge as Regulator’. At a time 
when there is a national debate about whether it is appropriate for judges to 
adjudicate on human rights questions, it is important to reflect on the high 
reliance we already place on judges. 
Before I explore that further, however, I want to say something more about 
Alfred Deakin and two related topics – his admiration and affection for all 
things American, and the high expectations of judges which he espoused.  
III DEAKIN AND AMERICA 
In welcoming the US Naval Fleet to Melbourne, Deakin said: 
Realising the riches of national relationships, we look, instinctively, first 
and most confidently, to you Americans, nearest to us in blood, in character, 
and in purpose. It is in this spirit, and in this hope, that Australia welcomes 
with open hands and heart the coming of your sailors, and of the flag, 
which, like our own, shelters a new world under the control of its vital 
union.  
May the present accord between English speaking peoples beget a perpetual 
concord of brotherhood between us.9 
I was first alerted to Deakin’s bond with America in 2005, when I heard 
Professor Marilyn Lake of La Trobe University speaking about a chapter she 
was writing for a book called What If? Australian History as it Might Have 
Been.10 The book was published in 2006 and her chapter is entitled ‘What if 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Lake, above n 2, 35. 
10 S Macintyre and S Scalmer (eds) (2006).  
2009 DEAKIN ORATION: TOO MUCH LAW? 147 
Alfred Deakin had made a declaration of Australian independence?’11 Thanks 
to the great assistance of Sarah Dillon, a researcher at the Court of Appeal and 
a first class honours graduate of this Law School, I have now been able to 
read a 2007 article by Professor Lake which explores in some detail what she 
calls ‘Alfred Deakin’s Identification with Republican Manhood’.12 What 
follows is largely taken from Professor Lake’s fascinating article.13 
Deakin’s love affair with America began in 1885 when, at the age of 28, he 
sailed to the United States. He travelled first to California, in his official 
capacity as Victorian Minister of Public Works and Water Supply to 
investigate irrigation schemes. As I discovered when I went to Mildura on a 
Court of Appeal circuit in May of this year, what Deakin learned about 
irrigation, and the contacts he made with the Chaffey brothers, led in due 
course to the development of Mildura as the centre of an irrigation district.  
According to Professor Lake, Deakin was most impressed with what he found 
in the United States. Arriving in the ‘great city’ of San Francisco on 29 
January 1885, he wrote that it seemed ‘busier and brighter than Melbourne’.14 
The energy of the people, their racial mixture and the splendid buildings all 
impressed the young visitor. He was particularly struck by the men: 
The men dress well and nearly all shave. Chief distinguishing feature [is] 
the brightness of eyes and quiet assurance which seem to say American.15 
Professor Lake’s article explores Deakin’s ‘American identifications through 
his passionate pursuit of three exemplars of Republican manhood: the writer 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, the philosopher Josiah Royce and the president 
Theodore Roosevelt’.16 It is touching to read of the week which Deakin spent 
with Royce in the Blue Mountains in 1888, ‘each the pupil in turn as their 
conversation ranged over philosophy, religion, history and politics’.17  
According to Lake, Deakin missed Royce enormously when he left Australia, 
and wrote him ‘beseeching letters’.18 These are now held in the Royce 
collection at Harvard but were not photocopied for the Deakin collection at 
the National Library of Australia as was the rest of Deakin’s correspondence. 
                                                 
11 Ibid 29. 
12 (2007) 38 (12a) Australian Historical Studies 32. 
13 I wish also to thank Brad Barr, also a Court of Appeal researcher, for his research assistance. 
14 Lake, above n 2, 32-3. 
15 Ibid 33. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid 34. 
18 Ibid. 
148 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 14 NO 2 
Professor Lake wonders aloud whether ‘their pleading tone was considered 
unbecoming to a future prime minister’.19 
She records that Deakin  
confided to Royce that when he was in Sydney again for the first 
Constitutional Convention in 1891, his mind was often elsewhere and he 
took the opportunity to slip away to their old haunts: ‘I ran up to the Blue 
Mountains & took my Easter by myself in the same hotel & in the same 
haunts as those in which we passed hours that were among the pleasantest I 
have ever spent.’20 
Deakin’s enthusiasm for America was to be contrasted with his ‘profound 
ambivalence’21 towards Britain. Deakin’s experience of colonial subjection 
was, by his own account, demeaning and humiliating. He was wholly 
unimpressed by what he saw as English presumption and pretension. His first 
visit to London was in 1887, when he represented Victoria at the first Colonial 
Conference. Time does not permit me to recount Deakin’s scathing criticisms 
of Britain’s political and intellectual leaders. They can be found in Professor 
Lake’s article. But I cannot resist a brief reference to a debate, which took 
place at a closed session of the conference, about the future of New 
Caledonia.  
The French were evidently anxious to persuade Britain to agree to abandon 
the hitherto agreed position of neutrality, and to agree that the islands be 
ceded to the French. The Australian States were opposed to this. The British 
Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, tried to explain to the Australians the 
inappropriateness of their stance on the Pacific. Writing in his Federal Story 
(contemporaneously written but not published until 1944),22 Deakin described 
his Lordship in these terms: 
His tone breathed the aristocratic condescension of a Minister addressing a 
deputation of visitors from the antipodes whom it became his duty to 
instruct in current foreign politics for their own sakes.23 
According to Deakin, the New South Wales delegate responded with 
‘whispering humbleness’.24 He himself spoke ‘almost last’.25 Speaking of 
himself in the third person, he wrote: 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid 50. 
22 See now, And Be One People: Alfred Deakin’s Federal Story (1995). 
23 Ibid 21. 
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He broke quite new ground not only with unrestrained vigour and 
enthusiasm on the general question as his colleagues had before him, but 
because he did so in a more spirited manner, challenging Lord Salisbury’s 
arguments one by one and mercilessly analysing the inconsistencies of his 
speech.26 
Tonight’s topic is prompted by what Alfred Deakin would no doubt have 
regarded as typical of the plain-speaking, intellectually challenging views of 
an American. That is certainly my view. As a post-graduate student in 
England in the late 1970s, I found that the greatest intellectual stimulus came 
from the North Americans: from the academics – Ronald Dworkin, then 
Professor of Jurisprudence, Charles Taylor, then Professor of Social and 
Political Theory, and Bill Weinstein, a lecturer in politics – and from the 
American post-graduate students I encountered. Their articulateness and 
enthusiasm for intellectual engagement was, quite simply, irresistible.  
It is beyond the scope of this lecture, but a very important question 
nonetheless, to ask why it is that in our legal discourse we still draw so little 
on American common law precedent. In a case to which I will refer in due 
course, I referred to an American line of authority in tort. But that is a rare 
occurrence. The High Court is, as far as I am aware, the only Australian court 
which refers to American authority with any frequency. I do not recall any 
American authority being cited in argument in my four years in the Court of 
Appeal. 
If there is truth in what Deakin felt, and in what I have experienced – that 
Australians have a stronger and more natural intellectual connection with 
North Americans than with our English colleagues – then surely we should be 
looking to enrich our legal culture with more of what the United States has to 
offer. 
IV ALFRED DEAKIN AND JUDGES 
Alfred Deakin’s Second Reading Speech for the Judiciary Bill was a tour de 
force. It takes up 27 pages of Hansard, in two columns, closely typed. It is a 
speech which repays reading,27 a formidable exposition of the importance of 
                                                                                                                    
24 Ibid 21-2. 
25 Ibid 22. 
26 Ibid. 
27 I was first alerted to this remarkable speech when Justice Susan Crennan quoted from it at 
her welcome to the High Court in November 2005.  
150 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 14 NO 2 
having a supreme court as the guardian and interpreter of the Constitution in a 
federal system.  
Deakin said that the High Court was ‘an absolutely essential portion of the 
Constitution under which we live … charged with the highest responsibilities 
to the people of this continent … [It was] … a structural creation which is the 
necessary and essential complement of a federal Constitution’.28 He 
continued: 
Its first and highest functions as an Australian court – not its first in point of 
time, but its first in point of importance – will be exercised in unfolding the 
Constitution itself. That Constitution was drawn, and inevitably so, on large 
and simple lines, and its provisions were embodied in general language, 
because it was felt to be an instrument not to be lightly altered, and indeed 
incapable of being readily altered; and, at the same time, was designed to 
remain in force for more years than any of us can foretell, and to apply 
under circumstances probably differing most widely from the expectations 
now cherished by any of us. Consequently, drawn as it of necessity was on 
simple and large lines, it opens an immense field for exact definition and 
interpretation. Our Constitution must depend largely for the exact form and 
shape which it will hereafter take upon the interpretations accorded to its 
various provisions. This court is created to undertake that interpretation.29 
I remember thinking, when I first heard that passage, how visionary it was, 
and how clearly it precluded any ‘originalist’ approach to constitutional 
interpretation in Australia. 
Deakin drew on the example of the United States Supreme Court: 
[T]he Americans have found themselves with a Constitution which might 
have been a dead letter, and must have been a heavy burden, but for the fact 
that they had created a Supreme Court capable of interpreting it, a court 
which had the courage to take that instrument, drawn in the eighteenth 
century, and read it in the light of the nineteenth century, so as to relieve the 
intolerable pressure that was being put upon it by the changed 
circumstances of the time. It is not too much to say that, but for the work 
done in this direction by the Supreme Court of the United States, we might 
not to-day see it as it is, still the revered bond of union of 70,000,000 or 
80,000,000 of free people.30 
The parallel with Australia was direct and exact: 
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29 Ibid 10965. 
30 Ibid 10967. 
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Precisely the same situation must arise in Australia, for although it be much 
easier to amend our Constitution, it is yet a comparatively costly and 
difficult task and one which will be attempted only in grave emergencies. In 
the meantime, the statute stands and will stand on the statute-book just as in 
the hour in which it was assented to. But the nation lives, grows, and 
expands. Its circumstances change, its needs alter, and its problems present 
themselves with new faces. The organ of the national life which preserving 
the union is yet able from time to time to transfuse into it the fresh blood of 
the living present, is the Judiciary – the High Court of Australia or Supreme 
Court in the United States. It is as one of the organs of Government which 
enables the Constitution to grow and to be adapted to the changeful 
necessities and circumstances of generation after generation that the High 
Court operates. Amendments achieve direct and sweeping changes, but the 
court moves by gradual, often indirect, cautious, well considered steps, that 
enable the past to join the future, without undue collision and strife in the 
present.31 
Deakin, himself a barrister through much of his early political career, had the 
utmost faith in the capability of judges. Asked by an interjector how the 
Constitution could deal with matters for which no express provision was 
made, he answered: 
Because the law, when in the hands of men like [Chief Justice] Marshall or 
those trained in his school, or of the great jurists of the mother country, 
becomes no longer a dead weight. Its script is read with the full intelligence 
of the time, and interpreted in accordance with the needs of the time. That 
task, of course, can be undertaken only by men of profound ability and long 
training. It is to secure such men that we desire the establishment of a High 
Court in Australia.32 
And Deakin had great faith in the ameliorating force of law: 
The reign of law, though invisible, really surrounds us at every stage in our 
lives, from the cradle to the grave. Without it no such development, no such 
progress as we have witnessed in social life would have been possible. … 
It is not for men of knowledge, or of our country, to look with a slighting 
and indifferent regard upon proposals to extend the area within which law 
operates. The fundamental choice still remains between war and law, 
between violence and reason, between force and justice. … The liberal 
party all the world over are [sic] being helped to a better realization of the 
possibilities of peaceful advance, which are afforded by the statute-book, 
                                                 
31 Ibid 10967-8. 
32 Ibid 10968. 
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and the necessary concomitant of the statute-book – courts capable of 
interpreting it – and seeing that its behests are enforced.33 
V THE JUDGE AS GATEKEEPER: THE GUARDIAN OF 
REASONABLENESS 
And so to my topic! Do we expect Australian judges to perform the role of 
gatekeeper, to be guardians of the limits of reasonableness? Do judges see 
themselves as cast in that role? The most obvious area for investigation – and 
the one most relevant to Philip Howard’s concerns – lies in the law of 
negligence. Risk and reasonableness are, of course, central to that field of 
jurisprudence. 
In Donoghue v Stevenson,34 Lord Atkin famously said that ‘You must take 
reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee 
would be likely to injure your neighbour’.35 Seventy years later, in Tame v 
New South Wales,36 Gummow and Kirby JJ again emphasised that  
the tort of negligence requires no more than reasonable care to avert 
reasonably foreseeable risks. Breach will not be established if a reasonable 
person in the defendant’s position would not have acted differently. The 
touchstone of liability remains reasonableness of conduct.37 
In Donoghue v Stevenson, Lord MacMillan recognised that the reasonableness 
of a defendant’s conduct would have to be assessed in the light of changing 
community values and circumstances. His Lordship said: 
In the daily contacts of social and business life human beings are thrown into, 
or place themselves in, an infinite variety of relations with their fellows; and 
the law can refer only to the standards of the reasonable man in order to 
determine whether any particular relation gives rise to a duty to take care as 
between those who stand in that relation to each other. The grounds of action 
may be as various and manifold as human errancy; and the conception of legal 
responsibility may develop in adaptation to altering social conditions and 
                                                 
33 Ibid 10988. 
34 [1932] AC 562. 
35 Ibid 580. 
36 (2002) 211 CLR 317. 
37 Ibid 383.  
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standards. The criterion of judgment must adjust and adapt itself to the 
changing circumstances of life.38 
Much has been written about the way in which Australian judges have 
developed this conception of legal responsibility for injury caused to others. I 
refer, for example, to the seminal article in 2002 by Chief Justice Spigelman, 
entitled ‘Negligence: the Last Outpost of the Welfare State’.39  
His Honour described the expansion of the reach of the law of negligence in 
the second half of the 20th century: 
Over a few decades – roughly from the sixties to the nineties – the 
circumstances in which negligence would be found to have occurred and the 
scope of damages recoverable if such a finding were made, appeared to 
expand considerably. Professor Atiyah referred to this long-term historical 
trend as ‘stretching the law’. There may be an equivalent parallel trend, 
perhaps of even greater practical significance, of ‘stretching the facts’.40 
In his Honour’s view, the limits of community acceptance had been reached – 
perhaps even passed: 
The traditional function of the law of negligence, reinforced as this function 
is in almost all cases by insurance, of distributing losses that are an 
inevitable by-product of modern living (the theme of Fleming’s Law of 
Torts on which many of us were weaned) appears to have reached definite 
limits as to what society is prepared to bear. Furthermore, there is a 
substantial body of anecdotal evidence of undesirable side effects of the 
present system: rural general practitioners who have ceased doing 
obstetrics; councils that have removed such lethal instruments as swings and 
seesaws from children’s playgrounds; charitable fundraising events that 
have been cancelled. The only reason why all our rock ledges and cliff tops 
are not festooned with signs is that nobody believes that they would actually 
affect the outcome of litigation and would probably make things worse.41 
By the time he was writing in April 2002, however, Spigelman CJ considered 
that ‘the long-term trend [had] been reversed’.42 A year earlier, Professor 
Luntz had written of what he pithily described as the ‘Torts Turnaround Down 
Under’.43 He pointed out that the High Court had delivered 96 tort judgments 
                                                 
38 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 619. 
39 (2002) 76 ALJ 432. 
40 Ibid 433. 
41 Ibid 434. 
42 Ibid. 
43 (2001) 1 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal (Part 1) 95. 
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over the period 1987-99, of which two thirds were ‘pro-plaintiff’. In 2000, by 
contrast, nine personal injury appeals were decided, of which only 22 per cent 
were pro-plaintiff. Professor Luntz described this as ‘a remarkable 
turnaround’.44  
It is beyond the scope of this lecture to explore the reasons for the change. 
What is quite clear is that, at every stage in the development of the law of 
negligence, judges have been asking and answering the question: what are the 
reasonable limits of legal liability? Self-evidently, that is a question about 
values, and different judges will give different answers. 
In 1939, in Chester v Waverley Corporation,45 the High Court was required to 
define the scope of the defendant council’s duty of care, the claim being for 
damages for nervous shock. Rich J said: 
The law must fix a point where its remedies stop short of complete 
reparation for the world at large, which might appear just to a logician who 
neglected all the social consequences which ought to be weighed on the 
other side.46  
In 2002, the High Court in Tame v New South Wales47 again considered the 
issue of liability for the negligent infliction of pure mental harm. The plaintiff 
had suffered psychiatric injury after being told that there was a statement in a 
police report to the effect that she had been driving under the influence of 
alcohol. The statement was false, and was very soon after corrected. She 
brought proceedings against the State, claiming that it was vicariously liable 
for the negligent conduct of the police officer who had made the error in the 
accident report.  
The High Court held that the police officer did not owe a duty of care to the 
plaintiff to avoid causing her psychiatric injury. It was not reasonably 
foreseeable that a person in her position would suffer psychiatric injury or 
illness as a result of a mistake being made about her blood alcohol level in a 
police report. In explaining their conclusion, the members of the Court 
applied the criterion of reasonableness to the asserted duty of care. 
 
                                                 
44 See also P Vines, ‘Schools’ Responsibility for Teachers’ Sexual Assault: Non-Delegable 
Duty and Vicarious Liability’ (2003) 27 MULR 612, 624-5. 
45 (1939) 62 CLR 1. 
46 Ibid 11. 
47 (2002) 211 CLR 317. 
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Gleeson CJ said: 
Requiring a person, when engaged in a certain kind of activity, to have in 
contemplation a certain kind of risk to others, may be extremely onerous, 
especially if predictability of harm were the only basis upon which such a 
requirement is imposed. Consider, for example, an occupier of land on 
which there is a dwelling house. It is clear that there is a duty of care to 
people who enter lawfully upon the land. But the content of the duty is not 
such as to require the occupier to compile a list of every potential source of 
danger in and around the house, and post the list at every possible point of 
entry to the land. People do not conduct their lives in that way, and it would 
not be reasonable to require them to do so. When regard is had to forms of 
possible harm other than physical injury to person or property, the 
consequences of a general requirement to be concerned about the welfare of 
others can become even more extreme. A case such as that of Mrs Tame 
explains the increasing awareness, both in the medical profession and in the 
community generally, of the emotional fragility of some people, and the 
incidence of clinical depression resulting from emotional disturbance. What 
would be the consequence, for the way in which people conduct their lives, 
of imposing upon them a legal responsibility to have in contemplation, and 
guard against, emotional disturbance to others? Considerations of that kind 
are not ‘floodgates arguments’. They go directly to the question of 
reasonableness, which is at the heart of the law of negligence. 
Reasonableness is judged in the light of current community standards. As 
Lord Macmillan said in Donoghue v Stevenson, ‘conception[s] of legal 
responsibility … adap[t] to … social conditions and standards’.48 
McHugh J said: 
I think that the time has come when this Court should retrace its steps so 
that the law of negligence accords with what people really do, or can be 
expected to do, in real life situations. Negligence law will fall — perhaps it 
already has fallen — into public disrepute if it produces results that ordinary 
members of the public regard as unreasonable. Lord Reid himself once said 
‘[t]he common law ought never to produce a wholly unreasonable result’. 
And probably only some plaintiffs and their lawyers would now assert that 
the law of negligence in its present state does not produce unreasonable 
results.49 
His Honour proceeded to illustrate how the concept of reasonable 
foreseeability required judges to make value judgments: 
When it is necessary to determine foreseeability in the duty context, the 
development of the law of negligence as a socially useful instrument now 
                                                 
48 Ibid 332 (emphasis added)(citations omitted). 
49 Ibid 354 (emphasis added)(citations omitted). 
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requires the rejection of the attenuated test of foreseeability propounded in 
The Wagon Mound [No 2] and adopted by this Court in Shirt. We should 
return to Lord Atkin’s test that: 
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can 
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. 
This statement should not be seen as laying down a simple factual issue, as 
it often is. Lord Wilberforce in Anns v Merton London Borough Council 
and Deane J in Jaensch, for example, seem to have regarded reasonable 
foreseeability as raising a mere factual issue. Lord Wilberforce thought that 
reasonable foreseeability was the equivalent of proximity and would create 
a duty unless negatived by policy factors. That proposition assumes that 
policy factors have no part to play in reasonable foreseeability. Deane J 
thought that both reasonable foreseeability and proximity were necessary to 
establish a duty of care. But I think it is arguable that the notion of 
reasonable foresight in Lord Atkin’s speech in Donoghue v Stevenson is, 
and was intended to be, a compound conception of fact and value. What is 
foreseeable is a question of fact — prediction, if you like. But 
reasonableness is a value. At least in some situations, policy issues may be 
relevant to the issue of reasonable foresight because reasonableness 
requires a value judgment.  … 
Because reasonable foreseeability is a compound conception of fact and 
value, policy considerations affecting the defendant or persons in similar 
situations arguably enter into the determination of whether the defendant 
ought reasonably to have foreseen that his or her acts or omissions were 
‘likely to injure your neighbour’.50 
His Honour then considered the ramifications of a finding that a duty of care 
was owed (and breached) in this case: 
To insist that the duty of reasonable care in pure psychiatric illness cases be 
anchored by reference to the most vulnerable person in the community — 
by reference to the most fragile psyche in the community — would place an 
undue burden on social action and communication. To require each actor in 
Australian society to examine whether his or her actions or statements 
might damage the most psychiatrically vulnerable person within the zone of 
action or communication would seriously interfere with the individual’s 
freedom of action and communication. To go further and require the actor 
to take steps to avoid potential damage to the peculiarly vulnerable would 
impose an intolerable burden on the autonomy of individuals. Ordinary 
people are entitled to act on the basis that there will be a normal reaction to 
their conduct. It is no answer to say that the defendant ought to be liable to 
peculiarly vulnerable persons because the defendant is guilty of careless 
                                                 
50 Ibid 355–6 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
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conduct. The common law of negligence does not brand a person as careless 
unless the law has imposed a duty on that person to avoid carelessly 
injuring others.51 
Gummow and Kirby JJ said: 
A fundamental objective of the law of negligence is the promotion of 
reasonable conduct that averts foreseeable harm. In part, this explains why a 
significant measure of control in the legal or practical sense over the 
relevant risk is important in identifying cases where a duty of care arises. 
Further, it is the assessment, necessarily fluid, respecting reasonableness of 
conduct that reconciles the plaintiff’s interest in protection from harm with 
the defendant’s interest in freedom of action. So it is that the plaintiff’s 
integrity of person is denied protection if the defendant has acted 
reasonably. However, protection of that integrity expands commensurately 
with medical understanding of the threats to it. Protection of mental 
integrity from the unreasonable infliction of serious harm, unlike protection 
from transient distress, answers the ‘general public sentiment’ underlying 
the tort of negligence that, in the particular case, there has been a 
wrongdoing for which, in justice, the offender must pay. Moreover, the 
assessment of reasonableness, which informs each element of the cause of 
action, is inherently adapted to the vindication of meritorious claims in a 
tort whose hallmark is flexibility of application. Artificial constrictions on 
the assessment of reasonableness tend, over time, to have the opposite 
effect.52 
Noting that ‘reasonableness of conduct’ remained ‘the touchstone of liability’ 
in negligence, their Honours commented: 
The asserted grounds for treating psychiatric harm as distinctly different 
from physical injury do not provide a cogent basis for the erection of 
exclusionary rules that operate in respect of the former but not the latter. To 
the extent that any of these concerns are not adequately met in particular 
categories of case by the operation of the ordinary principles of negligence, 
they may be accommodated, in the manner explained later in these reasons, 
by defining the scope of the duty of care with reference to values which the 
law protects.53 
They continued: 
Analysis by the courts may assist in assessing the reasonable foreseeability 
of the relevant risk. The criterion is one of reasonable foreseeability. 
Liability is imposed for consequences which the defendant, judged by the 
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52 Ibid 379 (emphasis added)(citations omitted). 
53 Ibid 383(emphasis added). 
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standard of the reasonable person, ought to have foreseen. Of course, this 
can sometimes lead to sharply divided views in assessing the evidence. The 
application of that criterion by this Court in Bunyan v Jordan and Chester v 
Waverley Corporation led in each case to a denial of recovery for ‘nervous 
shock’. The result in Chester, looked at today, perhaps shows that the 
determination of what ought reasonably to have been foreseen may differ 
from one age to the next. However, because the criterion is an objective one, 
what is postulated is a general (and contemporary) standard of 
susceptibility. It is in that context that references in judgments of this Court 
to hypothetical ‘ordinary’ or ‘reasonable’ standards of susceptibility to 
psychiatric harm are to be understood.54 
Hayne J similarly referred to the ‘touchstone’ of reasonableness: The 
conclusion that no duty was owed  
give[s] effect to the sometimes overlooked touchstone, of reasonableness, in 
examining and judging a defendant’s notional or actual expectations, 
knowledge and conduct. The criticisms so persuasively made in this case by 
McHugh J of the departures, in recent years by courts from the touchstone 
of reasonableness, and the realities of ordinary life, should in future be 
heeded by all courts.55 
VI THE INSURANCE ‘CRISIS’ OF 2002 
In May 2002, a Ministerial Meeting on Public Liability Insurance (comprising 
Commonwealth, State and Territory Ministers) established a panel to review 
the law of negligence. The Ministers said: 
Unpredictability in the interpretation of the law of negligence is a factor 
driving up [insurance] premiums.56 
The Terms of Reference for the Review Panel opened with this statement:  
The award of damages for personal injury has become unaffordable and 
unsustainable as the principal source of compensation for those injured 
through the fault of another. It is desirable to examine a method for the 
                                                 
54 Ibid 384-5 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
55 Ibid 429 (citations omitted). 
56 Ministerial Meeting on Public Liability Insurance, Communiqué, 3 June 2002, 
<http://www.adventurepro.com.au/news/index.pl?action=details&id=communique_mays_pli_
ministerial_meeting> at 2 October 2009. 
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reform of the common law with the objective of limiting liability and 
quantum of damages arising from personal injury and death.57  
In its September 2002 report, the Panel said that its starting point was the 
proposition that: 
[P]ersonal injury law comprises a set of rules and principles of personal 
responsibility. The Panel sees its task as being to recommend changes that 
impose a reasonable burden of responsibility on individuals to take care of 
others and to take care of themselves, consistently with the assumption 
inherent in the first paragraph of the Terms of Reference that the present 
state of the law imposes on people too great a burden to take care of others 
and not enough of a burden to take care of themselves.58 
It need hardly be pointed out that any such conclusion – about the extent to 
which we should be legally obliged to take care of others, and of ourselves – 
involves a fundamental moral and political judgment about the kind of society 
we want. 
In language strikingly similar to Philip Howard’s, the Panel noted the flow-on 
effect that the state of the law of negligence was perceived as having on the 
general community: 
[E]vidence has been provided to the Panel that throughout the country 
absence of insurance or the availability of insurance only at unaffordable 
rates has adversely affected many aspects of community life. Results have 
included the cancellation of community festivals, carnivals, art shows, 
agricultural shows, sporting events of all kinds, country fetes, music 
concerts, Christmas carols, street parades, theatre performances, community 
halls, and every manner of outdoor event. The Panel has been informed that 
some schools and kindergartens are not able to offer the facilities they 
would wish and some have had to close. Hospitals have experienced 
difficulties and the problems faced by members of the medical and other 
professions are well-attested. These are merely some examples of the way 
in which the fabric of everyday life has been harmed.59 
The Panel reported  
a widely held view in the Australian community that there are problems 
with the law stemming from perceptions that: 
                                                 
57 Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report, (2002) 25 [1.3] 
<http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/Report2/PDF/Law_Neg_Final.pdf> at 2 October 
2009. 
58 Ibid 29 [1.24] (emphasis added). 
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(a) The law of negligence as it is applied in the courts is unclear and 
 unpredictable. 
(b) In recent times it has become too easy for plaintiffs in personal injury 
 cases to establish liability for negligence on the part of defendants. 
(c) Damages awards in personal injuries cases are frequently too high.60 
The Panel commented: 
Irrespective of whether these perceptions are correct, they are serious 
matters for the country because they may detract from the regard in which 
people hold the law and, therefore, from the very rule of law itself.61 
Like other States and Territories, Victoria legislated in 2003 to implement the 
recommendations of the Panel’s Report. The result was a series of quite 
dramatic amendments to the Wrongs Act 1958. Section 48 now sets out what 
are described as ‘General principles’ regarding duty of care, as follows: 
(1) A person is not negligent in failing to take precautions against a risk of 
 harm unless— 
 (a) the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the person 
  knew or ought to have known); and 
 (b) the risk was not insignificant; and 
 (c) in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the person's  
  position would have taken those precautions. 
(2) In determining whether a reasonable person would have taken 
 precautions against a risk of harm, the court is to consider the following 
 (amongst other relevant things)— 
 (a) the probability that the harm would occur if care were not  
  taken; 
 (b) the likely seriousness of the harm; 
 (c) the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm; 
 (d) the social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm. 
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(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b)— 
 (a) insignificant risks include, but are not limited to, risks that are 
  far-fetched or fanciful; and 
 (b) risks that are not insignificant are all risks other than  
  insignificant risks and include, but are not limited to,   
  significant risks.62 
Likewise, section 51 now sets out ‘General principles’ of causation, as 
follows: 
(1) A determination that negligence caused particular harm comprises the 
 following elements— 
 (a) that the negligence was a necessary condition of the   
  occurrence of the harm (factual causation); and 
 (b) that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person’s  
  liability to extend to the harm so caused (scope of liability). 
(2) In determining in an appropriate case, in accordance with established 
 principles, whether negligence that cannot be established as a necessary 
 condition of the occurrence of harm should be taken to establish factual 
 causation, the court is to consider (amongst other relevant things) 
 whether or not and why responsibility for the harm should be imposed 
 on the negligent party. 
… 
(4) For the purpose of determining the scope of liability, the court is to 
 consider (amongst other relevant things) whether or not and why 
 responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the negligent party.63 
I draw attention, in particular, to section 51(1)(b). Parliament here makes 
quite explicit that, in reaching a conclusion about causation, the judge is 
making an assessment of the appropriateness of imposing liability on the 
negligent person. To put matters beyond doubt, subsection (4) requires the 
court to ask itself why responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the 
negligent party. These are large, normative, questions.  
A Supreme Court colleague of mine, with long experience in personal injuries 
litigation, tells me that these provisions have in fact made little difference in 
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practice – and are rarely mentioned in court. That appears also to be the case 
in New South Wales, as the Court of Appeal pointed out recently.64 Why that 
is so is a topic for another day. 
VII CONCLUSION 
Plainly enough, judges do assume – and the community expects judges to 
assume – the role of gatekeeper. Both at common law and now by statute, 
judges are entrusted with the function of assessing the reasonableness of the 
conduct of defendants and the appropriate scope of liability in negligence.  
As we have seen, Parliaments can and do intervene if the development of the 
common law by judges is perceived – in one way or another – to be contrary 
to the public interest. But, for the most part, the responsibility rests with 
judges. And the nature of the trust which the community reposes in judges can 
hardly be overstated. In the area of tort law, judges will continue to have to 
decide what is fair, just and reasonable.65 And these will inevitably be matters 
about which judges will disagree. 
Contrary to the arguments advanced in some quarters, there is nothing new or 
dangerous about giving judges the function of adjudicating on questions of 
human rights. As this investigation has demonstrated, judges are already 
entrusted with the responsibility of adjudicating upon dealings between 
citizen and citizen, and between citizen and government, by reference to 
normative standards of reasonableness. Judges are, in this important sense, 
already the custodians of community values. The sentencing function is 
another important example of the same phenomenon. 
Not only is human rights jurisprudence familiar to judges, especially in the 
areas of criminal law and in statutory interpretation, but it owes its very 
existence to the development of the common law. As Alfred Deakin said in 
his 1902 Second Reading Speech, ‘many of our most fundamental principles 
and liberties are founded directly upon judicial decisions’. 
I turn finally to my invocation of American authority. A case before the Court 
of Appeal concerned a claim for damages for intentional infliction of 
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emotional distress. Following a relationship breakdown, one partner 
distributed videos of their sexual activities with the intention of causing his 
former partner humiliation and distress. Proceeding cautiously and 
incrementally, as a judge of an intermediate court of appeal must always do, I 
concluded that such a claim was cognisable in law. Sadly, I was in a minority 
of one on this issue. I pointed out that American courts had for many years 
recognised such claims – but even that was not enough!66 
                                                 
66 Giller v Procopets [2008] VSCA 236 [37]. 
